(University of Kassel)
Přednáška proběhne v anglickém jazyce.
ABSTRACT: The purpose of my talk is to show why, despite the clear convergences between Plessner’s and Jonas’ philosophy of organism, the latter never mentions Plessner’s philosophy of nature as one of the antecedents to his project. My main claim is that Jonas’ silence can be explained based on one fundamental difference between the two approaches: the fact, in short, that Jonas’ proposal, before being ‚anthropological‘, is first and foremost ‚ontological‘. Jonas aims to establish a doctrine of living beings to answer the fundamental metaphysical question of modernity: «why is there something rather than nothing?». Conversely, Plessner’s philosophy of nature serves above all the purpose of understanding the eccentricity of humans and their relationship to the other living beings. This difference can be clearly outlined through an analysis of Plessner and Jonas’ dissimilar approaches to Heidegger’s ontology and particularly to his concept of ‚existentials‘, to which the central sections of my account is dedicated.