Thematic Series: Bernhard Weiss: From Tools to Rules: The Evolution of Rule Following
LMS Centre cordially invites everyone to the second talk of the Online LMS Series “Inferentialism on Naturalized Grounds”: Bernhard Weiss (University of Cape Town) From Tools to Rules: The Evolution of Rule Following ABSTRACT: The paper is interested in likely routes for the evolution of normative practice, which, it is here assumed, is a necessary precursor to the development of language. It argues that each normative practices requires a policing practice, consisting of, at least, moves of commendation, condemnation and retraction, and it contrasts policing with mere monitoring practice. So the evolution of norms can be seen to be the development of policing from mere monitoring practice. It conjectures that a likely site for such a development to take place is in the active transmission of technology, notably, toolmaking technology. Using data and observations drawn from the archaeological record and the psychology of mimicry, it attempts to illustrate the likely emergence of policing practices. For a pre-published version of the paper please contact the organizer at: matej.drobnak@uhk.cz When: April 6, 14:05 – 15:30 CET Where: Zoom, Meeting ID: 968 254 2971 https://cesnet.zoom.us/j/9682542971 Inferentialism on Naturalized Grounds is a series of online talks which accompanies the […]
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Barbora Šipošová: The role of joint attention for successful cooperation: insights from studies with children
Barbora Šipošová (FHS UK, Praha) The role of joint attention for successful cooperation: insights from studies with children ABSTRACT: The capacity for flexible cooperation in humans exceeds that of other species to such an extent that humans have received the label of being a hypercooperative species. The central question is, what are the cognitive processes supporting this capacity? Joint attention—the ability to coordinate attention to an object or event—is a key feature. Without joint attention, we would not be the cooperating species we are now. First, I will introduce a new look at different ways people coordinate their attention and establish common knowledge with others. Second, I will focus on my experimental studies with children and present the findings suggesting that attention sharing significantly increases cooperative and prosocial behavior.
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Thematic Series: Hans-Johann Glock: Norms, Reasons and Anthropological Naturalism
LMS Centre cordially invites everyone to the fourth talk of the Online LMS Series “Inferentialism on Naturalized Grounds”: Hans-Johann Glock (University of Zurich) Norms, Reasons and Anthropological Naturalism ABSTRACT: This article addresses the two most important areas of potential conflict between inferentialism and naturalism, namely normativity and rationality. Concerning the first, it sides with inferentialism, while at the same time developing a normativist position less vulnerable to naturalistic objections. There is nothing problematic or mysterious about semantic normativity or normativity in general. But one needs to distinguish different types of normativity and recognize that statements of norms can be perfectly truth apt. Concerning the second area of conflict, my verdict is partly naturalistic. It rejects overly intellectualist accounts of the normative practices that underlie meaning and content. The article ends with a plea for an ‘anthropological’ naturalism that eschews both ontological super-naturalism and epistemological naturalism. The attendance at the talk assumes that the paper has been pre-read. To obtain a pre-pusblished version of the paper, please contact the organizer at: matej.drobnak@uhk.cz When: March 23, 14:05 – 15:30 CET Where: Zoom, Meeting ID: 968 254 2971 https://cesnet.zoom.us/j/9682542971 Inferentialism on Naturalized Grounds is a series of online […]
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Ronald Loeffler: Belief as a first-person plural cognitive attitude, and recognizing common ground
Ronald Loeffler (Grand Valley State University) Belief as a first-person plural cognitive attitude, and recognizing common ground ABSTRACT: Belief is standardly assumed to be an intrinsically private cognitive attitude in the following sense: for any non-psychological, non-social first-order content that p – any content that does not contain specifically psychological or social concepts – believing that p does not intrinsically involve any recognition by the subject, that there are, or might be, others who do, might, or should endorse p as well. All such recognition is instead assumed to be due to special cognitive states or processes accompanying the first-order belief that p – such as higher-order thoughts containing the psychological concept of belief, or processes of mentally simulating others’ doxastic processes. Focusing on the kinds of beliefs involved in conscious, normgoverned, rational deliberation, this paper develops a theory of belief that rejects this mainstream assumption. Viewing such beliefs as, literally, propositional attitudes, I propose that believing that p intrinsically involves taking an implicit normative attitude towards others: p is treated by the subject, just due to the cognitive attitude taken towards p, as what “we jointly” are doxastically committed to. “Doxastic commitment” here means that nothing incompatible […]
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Thematic Series: Anke Breunig: Wilfrid Sellars on Science and the Mind
LMS Centre cordially invites everyone to the second talk of the Online LMS Series “Inferentialism on Naturalized Grounds”: Anke Breunig (University of Halle) Wilfrid Sellars on Science and the Mind ABSTRACT: This paper explores some ideas of Wilfrid Sellars to raise two difficulties for a naturalistic approach to the mind. The first difficulty, which is methodological, is a corollary of Sellars’s distinction between two images of man-in-the-world, the manifest and the scientific image. For Sellars, taking science seriously requires that we think of it as constructing a unified image of man-in-the-world of its own. I argue that it is the rivalry between the manifest and the scientific image which gives rise to the mind-body-problem. The challenge for a naturalistic solution to the mind-body-problem is that it is not legitimate to isolate single scientific results from their theoretical context in order to integrate them piecemeal into the manifest image. According to Sellars, a satisfactory solution to the mind-body-problem must attempt nothing less than a fusion of both images which somehow respects and preserves the unity of each. The second, substantial difficulty for a naturalistic approach to the mind is that of coming to terms with the normativity of […]
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Thematic Series: Ladislav Koreň: Evolution of Reason Giving and Confirmation Bias: What Has Been Explained?
LMS Centre cordially invites everyone to the second talk of the Online LMS Series “Inferentialism on Naturalized Grounds”: Ladislav Koreň (University of Hradec Králové) Evolution of Reason Giving and Confirmation Bias: What Has Been Explained? ABSTRACT: In their own way, inferentialists and interactionists both trace the roots of reflective reasoning to practices and skills for making, assessing and responding to public performances in communicative practices of giving and asking for reasons. Inferentialists have developed the idea mostly on conceptual grounds. Interactionists ask, in a more empirical spirit, why and how such practices and skills might have evolved. Thus they promise complementary “anthropological” insights of foremost interest to inferentialists. But interactionist theories advance a number of controversial claims that deserve careful scrutiny. In this essay I focus on one such claim: namely that confirmation bias can be plausibly explained as a design feature that promotes postulated functions of interactive reasoning. And I argue that each of three extant proposals fails to make the claim good. For a pre-published version of the paper please contact the organizer at: matej.drobnak@uhk.cz When: February 23, 14:05 – 15:30 CET Where: Zoom, Meeting ID: 968 254 2971 https://cesnet.zoom.us/j/9682542971 Inferentialism on Naturalized […]
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Thematic Series: Jaroslav Peregrin: Inferentialism Naturalized
LMS Centre cordially invites everyone to the first talk of the Online LMS Series “Inferentialism on Naturalized Grounds”: Jaroslav Peregrin (University of Hradec Králové) Inferentialism Naturalized ABSTRACT: Brandom’s inferentialism explains meaning in terms of inferential rules. As he insists that “the normative” (including meanings) is not reducible to “the natural”, inferentialism would seem an unlikely ally of naturalism. However, in this paper I suggest that Brandom’s theory of language harbors insights which can promote a naturalistic theory of meaning and language, and that a naturalistic version of Brandom’s inferentialism might have great potential. Also I sketch the lines along which such a theory could be built. For a pre-published version of the paper please contact the organizer at: matej.drobnak@uhk.cz When: February 9, 14:05 – 15:30 CET Where: Zoom, Meeting ID: 968 254 2971 Inferentialism on Naturalized Grounds is a series of online talks which accompanies the forthcoming issue of Philosophical Topics (https://www.uapress.com/philosophical-topics-journal/). The series and the issue aim to explore the idea of building inferentialism on naturalized grounds, to instigate discussions on how inferentialism and naturalism could be reconciled, and to investigate the synergic effects this reconciliation could have. The relations between inferentialism and […]
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Thematic Series: Inferentialism on Naturalized Grounds
The LMS Centre cordially invites everyone to the Online LMS Talks Series: Inferentialism on Naturalized Grounds The series accompanies a forthcoming issue of Philosophical Topics (https://www.uapress.com/philosophical-topics-journal), which aims to explore the idea of building inferentialism on naturalized grounds, to instigate discussions on how inferentialism and naturalism could be reconciled, and to investigate the synergic effects this reconciliation could have. The relations between inferentialism and naturalism are examined in both directions: a) how the results of scientific research in evolutionary theory, psychology (developmental, cognitive, experimental), empirical linguistics, and anthropology could support and influence the future development of inferentialism, as well as b) how the theoretical innovations of inferentialism could in turn fertilize and influence the direction of scientific research into these areas. The talks are focused on various topics including: Normativity of meaning/mental content Evolutionary grounds of normativity/rule-following and reasoning Social-normative Pragmatics Commitment-first approaches to language and communication Program of the series: 9. 2. Jaroslav Peregrin (University of Hradec Králové): Inferentialism Naturalized 23. 2. Ladislav Koreň (University of Hradec Králové): Evolution of Reason Giving and Confirmation Bias: What Has Been Explained? 9. 3. Anke Breunig (University of Halle): Wilfrid Sellars on Science and the Mind 23. 3. Hans-Johann Glock (University of Zurich): […]
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Petra Chudárková: Theory vs. Practice: The Challenges of Current Ethics
Petra Chudárková (Filozofická fakulta UP) Theory vs. Practice: The Challenges of Current Ethics ABSTRAKT: Úkolem normativní etiky je vytvářet principy správného a nesprávného jednání. Kromě této teoretické disciplíny má však etika i svou praktickou oblast, a tou je aplikovaná etika. Aplikovaní etikové čelí nelehkému úkolu, jímž je řešení reálných morálních problémů. Potřeba pružně a konstruktivně reagovat na aktuální témata však naráží na značná omezení: aplikovaní etikové se mezi sebou nedokáží shodnout na morálních principech a hodnotách, jež by měly být primárně akcentovány. Výsledkem pak je, že se dané problémy dále vyvíjí, aniž by odborníci dosáhli kýženého konsensu ohledně jejich řešení. Cílem mého příspěvku bude ukázat, že hlavním důvodem, proč se nedaří na dané problémy adekvátně reagovat, je problematická argumentace, která je příznačná vždy alespoň pro jednu stranu sporu. Své názory budu ilustrovat na vybraných tématech z oblasti aplikované etiky. Pokusím se také vysvětlit, proč se domnívám, že tento nedostatek představuje největší výzvu, které musí současná etika čelit.
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Michael Tomasello: How Children Come to Understand Beliefs and Reasons for Beliefs
ONLINE TALK On behalf of the LMS Center, we would like to invite you to a talk by: Michael Tomasello (Duke University) who will speak on: How Children Come to Understand Beliefs
and Reasons for Beliefs ABSTRACT: Understanding beliefs is more than just simulating others’ epistemic states or forming a theory about them. It involves, in addition, a kind of mental coordination in which the individual attempts to bring coherence to three different perspectives on a common situation: her own, a partner’s, and an “objective” perspective. Young children become capable of such coordination at around 4 years of age via species-unique skills and motivations of shared intentionality, as they are manifest in joint attention and linguistic communication. Understanding reasons for beliefs, emerging in ontogeny soon thereafter, involves a distinct kind of mental coordination as the individual attempts to justify her belief, as opposed to a partner’s, by grounding it logically or evidentially in beliefs they already share in common ground.
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