The View Which Has No Name
ABSTRACT: This proposed article also forms part of the aforementioned research arc in that it includes a descriptive analysis of the putative association between gradual behaviour in society, and philosophical-ethical thought in the field of animal ethics. Here I argue that the moral-philosophical view that “we should not use or harm non-human animals” has no particular name, but it ought to, and I say the reasons why. Further, I point out that this view is often given, or associated with, the name “vegan”, but that this can be misleading. Veganism can be understood as an identity, an attitude, or a practice, and can be motivated by animal ethical, environmental ethical, or health concerns. In this sense, it can be associated with labels like “catholic”, “European”, or “conservative”.
These are loose terms which can be more specifically defined or motivated in a range of ways. Any particular combination of vegan definitions or motivations may or may not be ethical, and even if ethical, may or may not be anthropocentric. I conclude that we should be very cautious in associating the apparently increasing prevalence of vegan identities or products in European society with a corresponding rise in the popularity of the kind of philosophical-ethical thought that we find in animal ethics. While vegan thought is taken as the specific case study, the arguments and findings here are meant to have more general significance in conceptual ethics, and the practical use of moral language.