(University of Hradec Králové)
ABSTRACT: In my talk I will focus on a recent elaboration of the venerable view of humans as rational animals.
On that elaboration, called Transformative Theory of Rationality (TT), basic animal powers for perception, desire, belief or volition can be realized in a rational or non-rational manner (McDowell, 1994, Boyle 2016, Marcus 2022). In rational animals, such powers are informed by rationality, properly understood. So, we can say that rationality transforms them. In non-rational animals, such powers are not informed by rationality. Put differently: there are two kinds of minds: rational and non-rational.
Mathew Boyle (2016), following John McDowell (1994), proposes that, properly developed, TT is an attractive account of human rationality. He proceeds via a critique of so-called Additive Theories of Rationality (AT). According to them, we are rational because we possess special rational powers in addition to non-rational mental powers that we share, in basically the same form, with other animals. Boyle argues that AT faces serious problems, whereas TT does not. This demonstrates the promise of TT.
Having introduced the debate and Boyle‘s critique of AT – focusing on so-called problems of Interaction and Unity -, I will explain why I find them wanting. Based on that – and if time allows – I will consider what better considerations there may be for viewing rationality as a transformative factor of sorts.