(Charles University)
ABSTRACT: Modal normativism is the philosophical position that the central function of modal vocabulary is to convey norms of reasoning. This view is significant in at least two ways. First, it supports a broadly pragmatist, anti-metaphysical approach that aims to demystify philosophical discussions surrounding the metaphysics of modality and the status of heavyweight metaphysics more generally. Secondly, it examines the intricate relationship between alethic modal and deontic normative vocabularies to shed light on the concept of intentionality, the hallmark of human consciousness. In this talk, I will (1) explore the history of modal normativism, (2) criticize aspects of contemporary modal normativism, and (3) propose some ways to address these issues.
The first part of the talk will provide an overview of the development from Carnap’s syntactical account of modality to Sellars’ analysis, leading to the contemporary theories of Robert Brandom and Amie Thomasson. In the second part of the talk, I will raise several challenges for Thomasson’s modal normativism. Specifically, I will argue that Thomasson’s theory does not sufficiently clarify (1) the precise sense in which modal statements are said to ‘convey’ normative propositions, (2) what types of normative propositions are conveyed by modal statements in the first place, and (3) how her account deals with other flavors of modality besides metaphysical modality. In the third and final part of my talk, I will discuss some possible solutions to these unresolved issues in an effort to advance contemporary modal normativism.